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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Ronald Wisdom appeals the district court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. Wisdom argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
opening the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
This post-conviction proceeding stems from a criminal jury trial that started on
February 26, 2016. (2/26/2016 Trial Tr., p.8, Ls.23-25. 1) The state tried Ronald Wisdom
on “three counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age of 16.” (2/26/2016 Trial Tr.,
p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.2.) The jury found Wisdom guilty on all three counts. (2/28/2014 Trial
Tr., p.6, Ls.3-10.)
The state presented its case at trial through five different witnesses, including ML,
the victim and Wisdom’s stepdaughter, and Christina Wisdom (Christina), ML’s mother
and Wisdom’s wife. (2/26/2014 Trial Tr., p.238, L.7 – p.239, L.4; 2/27/2014 Trial Tr.,
p.464, L.7 – p.465, L.11.) ML testified that Wisdom “touched me in the wrong spots like
my vagina [and] my boobs” using “[h]is mouth and his penis.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.470,
L.25 – p.471, L.7.) She confirmed that it “happen[ed] more than one time.” (2/27/2014
Trial Tr., p.473, Ls.3-5.) ML recalled the abuse starting when she was in third grade and
continuing until she was around 13 or 14. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.469, L.7 – p.471, L.22;
p.480, L.17 – p.481, L.12.) ML testified that she disclosed the abuse to her family in May
2013 when she was 14, and her stepbrother called the police. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.483,
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At Wisdom’s request, this Court took “judicial notice of the trial transcripts” in the
underlying criminal case. (6/21/2018, Order Granting Mot. To Take Judicial Notice.)
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L.24 – p.484, L.10; p.504, L.24 – p.505, L.7.) She also testified that she had told her
mother, Christina, about the abuse prior to May 2013, but the abuse continued. (2/27/2014
Trial Tr., p.478, Ls.4-13.)
Christina testified that, in the year leading up to ML’s disclosure of the abuse in
May 2013, ML “seemed to be a little bit withdrawing from people.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr.,
p.299, L.22 – p.300, L.3.) In March to May 2013, ML was “[m]ore irritable and angry.”
(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.300, Ls.4-7.) The state also elicited from Christina two experiences
that she had with Wisdom.
The first experience happened in the summer of 2012. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.289,
Ls.8-13.) Christina unexpectedly came home during a break at work. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr.,
p.291, Ls.8-15.) She saw “a shadow run . . . from [her] room across the hallway.”
(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.291, Ls.16-21.) She “slowly went upstairs into [her] room” to find
Wisdom “masturbating into the sink.” (Id.) Christina testified: “I was standing there for a
second and was surprised[,] [a]nd then I asked him what he was doing, and he looked up
and he had the fear of God in his eyes.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.292, L.22 – p.293, L.2.)
The second experience happened the first week of May 2013. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr.,
p.301, Ls.12-19.) Christina testified that Wisdom “said that he had done some horrible,
horrible things in his life, and that the only person that he was ever going to have to answer
to was God.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.302, Ls.1-8.) Christina “didn’t like the way that he
said it [and] wanted to know what he was talking about.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.302,
Ls.12-16.) When she asked Wisdom what he was talking about, he refused to answer and
“just said that there was some things that nobody was ever going to ever find out and that
he was going to have to answer to God.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.302, L.24 – p.303, L.4.)
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The state also sought to elicit from Christina that, when ML was five, ML told
Christina that Wisdom had inappropriately touched ML. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.334, L.8
– p.335, L.11.) Wisdom objected to the testimony as hearsay. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.342,
L.24 – p.343, L.25.) The state argued the statement was admissible as an excited utterance.
(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.344, L.2 – p.345, L.5.) The district court found the statement did
not qualify as an excited utterance. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.345, Ls.10-25.)
The district court then asked Wisdom’s counsel if “part of the defense in this case
[is] going to be . . . that [ML] never disclosed any of these events until she was 15 years
old.”

(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.1-4.)

Wisdom’s counsel answered “[y]es.”

(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.5-8.) The district court informed the parties that, “if that
comes up during the course of the trial, then it may well be that this type of evidence may
come in for a limited purpose, not to prove the truth of the statements but to prove that in
fact she had made disclosures previously.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.9-16.)
On cross-examination, Wisdom’s counsel asked Christina about her discussions
with law enforcement after ML disclosed the abuse in May 2013. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr.,
p.398, L.11 – p.400, L.10.) The following exchange took place:
Q. And when you were talking to Detective Ducharme there in I believe
May [2013], you told her basically that you didn’t have any information,
that you had never seen anything. Correct?
A. Yes.
(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.398, L.21 – p.399, L.1.)

The state argued that exchange was

“misleading to the jury” because Christina “did have other information” from ML’s prior
disclosure and thus “opened the door” to testimony that ML had previously disclosed the
abuse to Christina. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.418, L.20 – p.419, L.6.) Wisdom’s counsel
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argued that the exchange did not open the door because his question was strictly about “the
discussions” between Christina and law enforcement, not about what Christina did or did
not know. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.419, L.7 – p.420, L.9.)
The district court allowed “a limited amount of redirect” in the form of a single
question provided by the district court. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.421, L.19 – p.422, L.3.)
The state asked Christina the district court’s question: “Now this is just a yes or no question.
But isn’t it a fact that [ML] had told you of incidents of touching prior to May the 8th of
2013?” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.423, Ls.20-23.) Christina answered “[y]es.” (2/27/2014
Trial Tr., p.423, L.24.)
After the jury convicted Wisdom on all three counts of lewd conduct with a child
under 16 (2/28/2014 Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.3-10), the district court sentenced Wisdom to a
maximum of 40 years in prison with 20 years indeterminate on each count and ordered that
the time run concurrently (4/28/2014 Tr., p.628, Ls.1-16.). Wisdom filed a petition for
post-conviction relief. (R., pp.5-59.) As relevant to this appeal, he argued that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by asking Christina about her conversation with
law enforcement and opening the door for the state to elicit from Christina that ML had
previously disclosed the abuse to Christina. (R., pp.21-25.) The district court summarily
dismissed Wisdom’s claim because defense counsel “understood the law, prepared
adequately, and made a tactical decision to ask those questions to bolster Wisdom’s
defense.” (R., p.210.) Wisdom timely appealed. (R., pp.214-16.)

4

ISSUE
Wisdom states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Claim 4, which alleged
that trial counsel was ineffective for “opening the door” to prejudicial and
otherwise inadmissible evidence at trial, in part, because it applied an
evidentiary presumption that trial counsel’s actions were reasonable when
it should have considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the
petitioner?
(Appellant’s brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Wisdom failed to show the district court erred when it summarily dismissed
Wisdom’s ineffective assistance claim for post-conviction relief?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err In Summarily Dismissing Wisdom’s Claim
A.

Introduction
The district court properly granted the state’s motion for summary disposition on

Wisdom’s post-conviction petition. The facts are not in dispute: defense counsel asked
Christina a question on cross-examination that opened the door to evidence the district
court previously found inadmissible. Wisdom claims, relying solely on the trial transcripts,
that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because “[i]t is possible” that the
question resulted from a “slip of the tongue.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) That is not sufficient
to avoid summary dismissal.
Both Strickland’s 2 presumption and the uncontroverted evidence support the
inference drawn by the district court that defense counsel “made a tactical decision to ask
[the] question[].” (R., p.210.) Strickland required the district court to presume that tactical
reasons, rather than sheer neglect, animated defense counsel’s actions. And the record
supported that presumption: defense counsel took “a calculated risk” in asking the question
“to bolster Wisdom’s defense.” (R., pp.209-10.) Specifically, the question provided
defense counsel a way to attack Christina’s credibility and discredit damaging testimony
the state had elicited from Christina on direct examination, including a change in ML’s
behavior leading up to ML’s disclosure of the abuse; a story in which Christina saw a
shadow run out of her bedroom, walked into the bedroom, and saw “the fear of God in
[Wisdom’s] eyes” when she caught him “masturbating into the sink” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr.,
p.291, L.8 – p.293, L.2); and an admission from Wisdom, just weeks before ML’s

2

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
6

disclosure of the abuse, that “he had done some horrible, horrible things in his life”
(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.302, Ls.1-8).
The district court’s tactical-decision inference limits the manner in which Wisdom
can prove deficient performance. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
tactical decision constitutes deficient performance only when the petitioner shows it
resulted from a shortcoming capable of objective review, such as inadequate preparation
or ignorance of the relevant law. “Wisdom shows nothing of the kind.” (R., p.210.)
B.

Standard Of Review
“Summary dismissal of a petition is the procedural equivalent of summary

judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.” Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 536, 348 P.3d 145, 151
(2015). The “[c]ourt must determine whether the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits on file create a genuine issue of fact.” Id. If not, “[s]ummary disposition of a
petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate.” Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 217,
395 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2017). “Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists.” Takhsilov v. State, 161 Idaho 669, 672, 389 P.3d 955, 958 (2016).
Contrary to Wisdom’s contention otherwise (Appellant’s brief, p.6), “the trial judge
is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a summary judgment
motion” but “‘is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts.’” Adams, 158 Idaho at 536, 348 P.3d at 151 (quoting
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008)). “Such inferences will
not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them.”
Thompson v. State, No. 44542, Slip Op. at 5 (Idaho App. Feb. 20, 2018).
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C.

Wisdom Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
Wisdom failed to produce the evidence necessary to avoid summary dismissal of

his post-conviction claim. “A post-conviction relief claim based on ineffective assistance
of counsel will only avoid summary dismissal where the defendant establishes the
existence of material issues of fact as to whether: (1) counsel’s performance was
objectively deficient and; (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant’s case.” Adams, 158
Idaho at 536, 348 P.3d at 151 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
The district court properly found Wisdom failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact on Strickland’s first prong. (R., p.210.) The first prong of Strickland requires proof
that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466
U.S. at 687-88. Under Strickland, “‘there is a strong presumption that [counsel took certain
actions] for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.’” State v. Hall, No. 41059,
Slip Op. at 84 (Idaho Apr. 11, 2018) (brackets in original) (quoting Yarborough v. Gentry,
540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). “[S]trategic and tactical decisions . . . cannot serve as a basis for
post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective
review.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). Wisdom’s postconviction claim fails because (1) the district court properly inferred that defense counsel
made a tactical decision to ask Christina the question at issue and (2) Wisdom provided no
evidence to show the tactical decision “resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of
the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.” Id.
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1.

The Strickland Presumption And The Uncontroverted Evidence Support
The District Court’s Tactical-Decision Inference

Both the Strickland presumption and the uncontroverted evidence support the
district court’s inference that defense counsel made a tactical or strategic decision to ask
Christina the question at issue. (R., pp.209-10.) At least since Strickland, the U.S.
Supreme Court has instructed that a court considering an ineffective assistance claim “must
indulge a strong presumption that . . . the challenged action ‘might be considered sound
trial strategy.’” 466 U.S. at 689 (citing Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has, for decades, followed suit. See, e.g., Hall, No. 41059, Slip
Op. at 84 (“‘[T]here is a strong presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical
reasons rather than through sheer neglect.’” (brackets in original) (quoting Yarborough,
540 U.S. at 8)); Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 576, 976 P.2d 927, 930 (1999) (“It is
presumed that counsel is competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal
strategy.”); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 434, 725 P.2d 135, 139 (1986) (“The
presumption in evaluating attorney effectiveness is that the attorney is competent and that
his actions represented sound trial strategy.”). And Idaho’s appellate courts have long held
the view that “counsel’s . . . manner of cross-examination . . . fall[s] within the area of
tactical, or strategic, decisions.” Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368
(1993) (citing State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Ct. App.
1991)).
Wisdom’s suggested inference on appeal—that defense counsel had a “slip of the
tongue” (Appellate brief, p.7)—runs head first into Strickland’s presumption. His postconviction claim is based entirely on a specific question defense counsel asked Christina
during cross-examination, and cross-examination falls squarely “within the area of tactical,
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or strategic, decisions,” Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368, where “‘[t]here is a strong
presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical reasons rather than through
sheer neglect,’” Hall, No. 41059, Slip Op. at 84 (second brackets in original) (quoting
Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 8). Moreover, Wisdom offered no evidence outside of the trial
transcript as proof that defense counsel did not make a tactical decision in asking the
question at issue (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8), which means the Strickland presumption
applies with “particular force” in this case, Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5 (“That presumption
has particular force where a petitioner bases his ineffective-assistance claim solely on the
trial record.”).
All that Wisdom offers is the trial transcript, which his appellate counsel claims
shows that “[i]t is possible” that defense counsel had “a slip of the tongue.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.7.) That speculative interpretation of the trial transcript, which was not presented
to the district court and is contradicted by Wisdom’s own petition for post-conviction relief
(R., p.25 (describing defense counsel asking the question as a “decision”)), cannot possibly
overcome the Strickland presumption that defense counsel made a tactical decision. See
Hall, No. 41059 Slip Op. at 84-85 (affirming summary dismissal of post-conviction claim
because “Hall has failed to present evidence to overcome th[e] presumption” (emphasis
added)).
Wisdom argues that the Strickland presumption does not apply at the summary
disposition stage of post-conviction proceedings absent an evidentiary hearing.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) Tellingly, he cites no case that has so held. More to the point,
the Idaho Court of Appeals has held the opposite: even absent an evidentiary hearing “the
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the acceptable range of professional
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assistance controls” because “the procedural posture makes no difference in analyzing” an
ineffective assistance claim. Ramsey v. State, 159 Idaho 887, ___, 367 P.3d 711, 718-19
(Ct. App. 2015). And the Idaho Supreme Court has applied the Strickland presumption at
the summary dismissal stage without an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Hall, No. 41059
Slip Op. at 84-85; Payne, 146 Idaho at 561-64, 199 P.3d at 136-40.
Finding no support for his position in the case law, Wisdom resorts to the argument
that application of the Strickland presumption prior to an evidentiary hearing is “bad
policy” because “every petitioner would need an affidavit from counsel saying his or her
action was not a strategic choice.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.) Wisdom’s policy
argument grossly exaggerates the effect of the Strickland presumption. See, e.g., McKay
v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571, 225 P.3d 700, 704 (2010) (finding a petitioner overcame the
presumption without such an affidavit where “there [was] no conceivable tactical
justification for trial counsel’s failure to object”).
To the extent the Strickland presumption forecloses ineffective assistance claims,
like Wisdom’s, that simply point to the trial transcript and allege sheer neglect on the part
of defense counsel in an area traditionally considered part of trial counsel’s strategy, it is
working precisely as the U.S. Supreme Court intended. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68990 (explaining rationale for presumption including that, without the presumption, “[t]he
availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance . . . would encourage
the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges”; “[c]riminal trials resolved unfavorably to
the defendant would increasingly be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s
unsuccessful defense”; and “[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel . . . could dampen the ardor and
impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases,
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and undermine the trust between attorney and client”). Indeed, adopting Wisdom’s nopresumption policy for summary dismissals decided prior to an evidentiary hearing would
undoubtedly mean “criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would . . . be
followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s unsuccessful defense.” Id. Any petitioner
could force an evidentiary hearing by pointing to a decision traditionally recognized as
tactical (e.g., the decision to focus on one issue more than another) and alleging sheer
neglect (e.g., defense counsel forgot to focus on the right issue). Strickland clearly, and
quite deliberately, demands much more. See Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5 (rejecting lower
court’s finding of deficient performance because “[w]hen counsel focuses on some issues
to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons
rather than through sheer neglect” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)).
Even looking beyond the Strickland presumption in this case, the uncontroverted
record supports the district court’s inference that defense counsel made a tactical or
strategic decision. During the pre-trial conference, defense counsel indicated that his
strategy with respect to Christina was to destroy her credibility by showing the jury that,
even though she claimed at trial to have information about the abuse, she failed to disclose
that same information to law enforcement as part of the investigation:
But I think what also will definitely come out is, from May 9 until he is
indicted about October 5, [Christina] met repeatedly with law enforcement
and purportedly helped the investigation along by answering their questions
and giving them access to [ML]. . . . [A]ll along the way [Christina] lied.
She failed to disclose that, “Yeah, [ML] has told me about” or “[ML] has
made these three prior disclosures,” so that’s going to come out at trial. It’s
going to really diminish her credibility in the sense that she is going to have
to admit that she withheld information . . . . I think her credibility is pretty
much shot already in terms of what she has done and her actions and these
that she is going to have to admit to.
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(2/21/2014 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-24 (emphasis added). 3) He set up that strategy in his opening
statement by explaining to the jury that:
Christina, his wife, is interviewed several times by law enforcement, and
they’ll tell you that she appeared to be genuinely upset, genuinely surprised
by the whole situation; wanted to be part of the process and do what she
could to help. But she had no information, hadn’t seen anything, hadn’t
heard anything, “This is all news to me.”
(2/26/2014 Trial Tr., p.137, Ls.10-17.) He then listened to the state elicit damaging
information from Christina related to the abuse, including (1) a dramatic change in ML’s
behavior in the year leading up to her May 2013 disclosure of the abuse (2/27/2014 Trial
Tr., p.299, L.13 – p.300, L.16); (2) an incident that took place less than a year before ML’s
May 2013 disclosure in which Christina presumably walked into Christina’s bedroom
immediately after an instance of the abuse and saw “the fear of God in [Wisdom’s] eyes”
when she caught him masturbating into the sink (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.291, L.8 – p.293,
L.25); 4 and (3) an admission from Wisdom, just days before ML’s May 2013 disclosure of
the abuse, that “he had done some horrible, horrible things in his life, and that the only

3

Even without defense counsel’s discussion of attacking Christina’s credibility by making
her “admit that she withheld information” (id.), the district court still could have inferred
defense counsel made a tactical decision to ask the question in order to attack Christina’s
credibility, see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011) (“Although courts may not
indulge ‘post hoc rationalization’ for counsel’s decisionmaking that contradicts the
available evidence of counsel’s actions, neither may they insist counsel confirm every
aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions.” (citation omitted)). In fact, the focus of
the inquiry is “the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s
subjective state of mind.” Id. at 110. At the very least, however, defense counsel’s
expressed trial strategy provides an example of a sound trial strategy that could have
supported defense counsel asking the question.
4

Although Christina could not identify the shadow that ran out of her bedroom shortly
before she caught Wisdom in her bedroom masturbating into the sink (2/27/2014 Trial Tr.,
p.292, Ls.1-10), based on the circumstances of the event, the state suggested to the jury
that Christina had “almost caught” Wisdom abusing ML (2/28/2014 Trial Tr., p.58, L.21 –
p.59, L.13).
13

person that he was ever going to have to answer to was God” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.301,
L.8 – p.302, L.8). Faced with this damaging testimony from Wisdom’s own wife, defense
counsel made the tactical decision to follow through with his strategy to attack Christina’s
credibility by asking Christina the question at issue, and Christina gave the exact answer
that defense counsel wanted:
Q. And when you were talking to Detective Ducharme there in I believe
May [2013], you told her basically that you didn’t have any information,
that you had never seen anything. Correct?
A. Yes.
(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.398, L.21 – p.399, L.1.)
Wisdom disagrees with the district court’s inference, arguing that “it is not clear
whether the question was part of defense counsel’s strategy or a slip of the tongue.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) He believes that it is “possible” that defense counsel may have
intended to leave out the part of the question regarding Christina’s failure to disclose
“information” and instead only ask the part of the question regarding Christina’s failure to
disclose what she had “seen.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) The district court thus erred, in
Wisdom’s view, because it had an obligation to draw the contested inference in favor of
Wisdom and find defense counsel’s question to be an inadvertent mistake. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.7-8.) Wisdom’s argument is both legally and factually flawed.
As a legal matter, “the trial judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
the party opposing a summary judgment motion” but “‘is free to arrive at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted facts.’” Adams, 158 Idaho at 536, 348 P.3d
at 151 (quoting Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443, 180 P.3d at 482). Here, the facts are
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uncontroverted: the trial transcripts speak for themselves. Thus, the district court was “free
to arrive at the most probable inference[] to be drawn from the uncontroverted facts.” Id.
As a factual matter, the undisputed facts do not support Wisdom’s inference that
defense counsel had a slip of the tongue. Defense counsel announced in the pre-trial
conference and previewed in his opening statement his strategy to attack Christina’s
credibility by showing she did not disclose information about the abuse to law enforcement
during their investigation. (2/21/2014 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-24; 2/26/2014 Trial Tr., p.137, Ls.1017.) Wisdom asks this Court to infer that the “you didn’t have any information” portion of
the question resulted from a “slip of the tongue.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) But forcing
Christina to admit that she “told [the detective] . . . that [she] didn’t have any information”
was the entire thrust of the question; defense counsel wanted to highlight the discrepancy
between Christina claiming at trial that she did have information about the abuse and
Christina telling law enforcement during their investigation that she did not have
information about the abuse. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.398, L.21 – p.399, L.1.) Simply
having Christina confirm that she had not “seen” anything, as Wisdom suggests defense
counsel “possibl[y]” would have done but for the speculative “slip of the tongue”
(Appellant’s brief, p.7), would not have been an attack on Christina’s credibility at all
because Christina never claimed that she had actually seen the abuse.
In light of the uncontroverted evidence, the district court drew the most probable
inference—and the only reasonable inference given the Strickland presumption: defense
counsel made a tactical or strategic decision to ask Christina the question at issue during
cross-examination. (R., pp.209-10.) Because the record justifies the district court’s
inference, it cannot “be disturbed on appeal.” Thompson, No. 44542, Slip Op. at 5.
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2.

Wisdom Provided No Evidence That Defense Counsel’s Tactical Decision
Resulted From Inadequate Preparation Or Ignorance Of The Relevant Law

The district court’s tactical-decision inference limits the kind of evidence Wisdom
could provide to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Idaho Supreme Court refuses
to second-guess tactical decisions absent a showing that the tactical decision resulted from
a “shortcoming[] capable of objective review.” Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136.
The only “shortcomings capable of objective review” that the Idaho Supreme Court has
recognized are “inadequate preparation” and “ignorance of the relevant law.”

Id.

Accordingly, “[i]n the absence of evidence that a strategic decision was ‘the product of
inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant law,’ this Court will not find deficient
performance.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 488, 348 P.3d 1, 103 (2015) (quoting
Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 11, 319 P.3d 491, 495 (2014)). As the district court found,
“Wisdom shows nothing of the kind.” (R., p.210.)
Defense counsel knew the relevant law. Prior to defense counsel asking the
question at issue, he argued the relevant law to the district court as part of his hearsay
objection—and won. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.342, L.24 – p.345, L.25.) The district court
then explained to defense counsel that, if he brings up “that [ML] never disclosed any of
these events until she was 15 years old,” the past disclosure to Chrstina “may come in for
a limited purpose . . . to prove that in fact she had made disclosures previously.” (2/27/2014
Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.1-18.) Defense counsel responded that he understood. (2/27/2014 Trial
Tr., p.346, L.19.)
Defense counsel also adequately prepared.

When it came time for cross-

examination, as the district court found, defense counsel decided to “tak[e] a calculated
risk” that the question at issue “wouldn’t be deemed to ‘open the door’ to evidence of the
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victim’s prior report,” and he did so “with his eyes wide open.” (R., p.209.) When the
state argued the question had opened the door, defense counsel was prepared with a
colorable argument as to why the question did no such thing. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.419,
L.7 – p.420, L.9.) Although the district court ultimately held the door had been at least
partially opened (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.421, Ls.19-21), defense counsel’s performance is
not deficient “merely because a tactical decision yielded an unfavorable result.” Reynolds
v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 29, 878 P.2d 198, 203 (1994).
In short, Wisdom’s claim fails because there is no evidence in the record—and
Wisdom does not even argue—that defense counsel’s tactical decision was the product of
ignorance of the relevant law or inadequate preparation. See State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho
345, 384, 313 P.3d 1, 40 (2013) (holding “that the district court did not err by summarily
dismissing this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel” given “the absence of evidence
suggesting [defense counsel’s tactical decision] was the product of inadequate preparation
or ignorance of the relevant law”).
Wisdom claims that “[d]efense counsel’s error is a shortcoming capable of
objective review.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) His bald assertion misses the point. The
Idaho Supreme Court refuses to second guess tactical or strategic decisions precisely
because the decisions themselves are not capable of objective review. See, e.g., Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689 (observing “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in
any given case” and “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a
particular client in the same way”). That is why a petitioner must present evidence that the
tactical or strategic decision “resulted from . . . shortcomings capable of objective review,”
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such as “inadequate preparation” or “ignorance of the relevant law.” Payne, 146 Idaho at
561, 199 P.3d at 136 (emphasis added).
For example, a petitioner cannot prove ineffective assistance merely by pointing to
a tactical decision not to ask certain questions on cross-examination. See, e.g., Eddington
v. State, 162 Idaho 812, 822, 405 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2017) (finding petitioner “has
not made out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance” because “[t]rial counsel’s
decision to not . . . ask certain questions may have been a tactical decision”). But the
petitioner may be successful if he can show that same tactical decision resulted from
defense counsel being inadequately prepared. See, e.g., Eddington, 162 Idaho at 821, 405
P.3d at 606 (reversing summary dismissal of ineffective assistance claim where petitioner
alleged that, “if trial counsel was adequately prepared for the sentencing hearing, he would
have refuted the [witness’s] testimony with evidence of cell phone records, e-mail records,
and audio police report interviews that contradicted her testimony”).
Wisdom asking this Court to find that the tactical decision itself qualifies as a
shortcoming capable of objective review is no different than inviting this Court to secondguess a tactical decision. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) This Court should, as it always has,
decline the invitation. See, e.g., Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 384, 313 P.3d at 40 (“[T]his Court
does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions.”); Curless v. State, 146 Idaho 95,
100, 190 P.3d 914, 919 (Ct. App. 2008) (“This Court has long adhered to the proposition
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that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal
. . . .”). 5
Even setting aside this Court’s continued refusal to second-guess tactical or
strategic decisions, defense counsel’s tactical decision to attack Christina’s credibility was
reasonable because Christina was an important witness for the state. As the state told the
jury during closing argument, Christina “gave you the background and context to view this
in.” (2/28/2014 Trial Tr., p.57, Ls.15-16.) She testified that ML changed her behavior
leading up to ML’s disclosure of the abuse. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.299, L.13 – p.300,
L.25.) She implied that she almost caught Wisdom in the act of abusing ML. (2/27/2014
Trial Tr., p.291, L.8 – p.239, L.25). And she relayed an admission Wisdom made shortly
before ML disclosed the abuse that “he had done some horrible, horrible things in his life.”
(2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.301, L.8 – p.302, L.8).
Wisdom argues that counsel’s “‘strategic’ choice to permit the introduction of the
prior disclosure” was “objectively unreasonable because the evidence runs counter to the
defense theory of recent fabrication.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) But defense counsel did
not make a strategic decision to permit the introduction of the evidence; he made a strategic
decision to take “a calculated risk” in order “to bolster Wisdom’s defense.” (R., pp.209-

5

Wisdom’s reliance on McKay is misplaced. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) In McKay, the
Idaho Supreme Court did not second-guess a tactical decision. In fact, it expressly
recognized that “[t]rial counsel’s tactical decisions cannot justify relief ‘unless the decision
is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective review.’” McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at
703 (quoting Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136). Instead, the McKay court reversed
the district court’s summary dismissal only after finding that defense counsel could not
have made a tactical decision at all because “there [was] no conceivable tactical
justification for trial counsel’s failure to object.” 148 Idaho at 571, 225 P.3d at 704. Unlike
in McKay, the uncontroverted record here supports the district court’s inference that
defense counsel made a tactical decision. See supra Part C.1.
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10.) The subsequent admission of the evidence as the unwanted result of defense counsel’s
tactical decision does not make his performance deficient. Reynolds, 126 Idaho at 29, 878
P.2d at 203 (“[I]n the context of a post-conviction proceeding, we will not find counsel’s
conduct to be deficient merely because a tactical decision yielded an unfavorable result.”).
Wisdom also argues that the decision “was objectively unreasonable” because
defense counsel could have asked a different question that “benefitted Mr. Wisdom without
opening the door to the prior disclosure evidence.” 6 (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) That
erroneously assumes defense counsel knew the question at issue would open the door.
Strickland, however, requires that “every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects
of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 466 U.S. at 689. Contrary
to Wisdom’s assertion that defense counsel was “aware that [the question] would open the
door to unfavorable evidence” (Appellant’s brief, p12), the district court found that defense
counsel took a “calculated risk” that the question “wouldn’t be deemed to ‘open the door’”
to the other evidence (R., p.209).
Indeed, defense counsel had a colorable argument to keep the door closed, which
would have allowed him to attack Christina’s credibility without the additional evidence
from the state being presented to the jury—a win-win for Wisdom. The state argued that
defense counsel opened the door by “misleading . . . the jury.” (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.418,

6

As explained above, Wisdom’s proposed version of the question, which Wisdom’s
appellate counsel drafted with the obvious advantage of hindsight, would not have had the
same benefit as the question defense counsel actually asked. True, the revised version of
the question would have shown “the witness had no personal knowledge that any abuse
had occurred” (Appellant’s brief, p.12), but that was never a disputed issue—and defense
counsel was attempting to destroy Christina’s credibility, not just show she lacked personal
knowledge.
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L.20 – p.419, L.6.) Specifically, in the state’s view, Christina’s testimony that she told the
detective she did not have any information misled the jury because “she did have other
information.” (Id. (emphasis added)). In response, defense counsel argued Christina’s
testimony did not mislead the jury because his question focused on the “discussions”
between Christina and law enforcement (i.e., what Christina said to law enforcement) as
opposed to what Christina actually knew. (2/27/2014 Trial Tr., p.419, L.7 – p.420, L.9.)
Defense counsel reasonably believed that Christina testifying that she told the
detective she did not have any information (which everyone agreed Christina, in fact, told
the detective) did not mislead the jury. (See id.) Ultimately, the trial court sided with the
state, but that result does not prove that strategically taking the risk constituted deficient
performance. See Reynolds, 126 Idaho at 29, 878 P.2d at 203 (“[I]n the context of a postconviction proceeding, we will not find counsel’s conduct to be deficient merely because
a tactical decision yielded an unfavorable result.”); accord Patel v. Dormire, 609 F. Supp.
2d 884, 888 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (holding “calculated risk that the questioning would be
perceived by the trial court as opening the door” was not deficient performance, “especially
since aggressively attacking [the witness’s] credibility was so vital to petitioner’s success
at trial”).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the summary dismissal of
Wisdom’s ineffective assistance claim for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2018.
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